OBSTACLES TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE-EAST

In September 1993, PLO and Israel signed a self-rule agreement widely hailed as a breakthrough for peace in the Middle East. However, the ul timate test for the success of the Israeli-PLO Accord - which was faci litated by Norwegian mediators (the 'Oslo channel') - is its actual im plementation. In the present article it is argued that the way from ag reement on principles to the specification and implementation of actio n strategies is indeed long and thorny. This is due to the Middle East ern conflict structure which is characterized by (i) decentralised dis tribution of power/absence of a hegemon, (ii) overlapping of various c onflict dimensions, and (iii) the widespread zero-sum attitude towards conflict. These structural features have made their imprint on the co nflict dynamics in the region, providing actual conflicts with a high potential for escalation and low potential for resolution. Due to its capacity to control escalation processes and the experience that may f unction as a substitute for real peace (political accommodation), peac ekeeping has been extensively applied in the Middle East as an instrum ent for conflict management. Recent developments - i.e. the virtual wi thdrawal of Russia from the Middle East and the Gulf War - indicate, h owever, that the post Second World War conflict structure in the Middl e East is about to change, thus improving the conditions for conflict resolution (political accommodation). It would seem that the destiny o f the 'Oslo process' - which can derail anywhere from agreement on pri nciples to actual implementation - is a strategic test on changes in t he structural conditions for conflict management in die Middle East.