GIBSON ENVIRONMENT, HUSSERL LEBENSWELT, THE WORLD OF PHYSICS, AND THEREJECTION OF PHENOMENAL OBJECTS

What we perceive, according to James J. Gibson, are components of the ecological environment or, according to Edmund Husserl, components of the Lebenswelt, the life-world, of which we ourselves are a proper par t; we do not perceive the world as physics conceives of it, nor do we each perceive our own personal phenomenal environment, which is immane nt to consciousness. In the present article, the first of three main s ections addresses the relation, in Gibson's view, between the ecologic al environment and the world of physics, including Gibson's proposed e cological science. This new science does not defer to physical science regarding what is actually there and can be perceived, there in the o ne and only world that exists, where we and all the animals live and w hich physicists and other scientists study. The second main section is concerned with Husserl's concept of the life-world, for which he too proposes a new science. The life-world consists of all that concretely exists and can give, by being perceived, meaning and validity to the claims of all the sciences, including the ''technique'' of physics. Th e third main section uses theoretical accounts and arguments from Gibs on and Husserl to reject the fairly common doctrine in psychology and elsewhere that phenomenal matters comprise the intentional objects of perceptual consciousness. Indeed, the world we perceive is not a subje ctive or private world; it is not a world created by the mind or belon ging to consciousness. Rather, as Husserl argued, we see the actual tr ee in the garden, and not a second, immanental tree which cannot burn.