BARGAINING SETS WITH SMALL COALITIONS

Authors
SCHJODT U SLOTH B
Citation
U. Schjodt et B. Sloth, BARGAINING SETS WITH SMALL COALITIONS, International journal of game theory, 23(1), 1994, pp. 49-55
Citations number
8
Categorie Soggetti
Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods","Mathematical, Methods, Social Sciences
Journal title
International journal of game theory → ACNP
ISSN journal
00207276
Volume
23
Issue
1
Year of publication
1994
Pages
49 - 55
Database
ISI
SICI code
0020-7276(1994)23:1<49:BSWSC>2.0.ZU;2-X
Abstract
We study two alternative definitions of the bargaining set in large (a tomless) economies; the local bargaining by MasColell (1989) and the g lobal bargaining set by Vind (1992). We alter these definitions to lim it the size of the permitted size of the involved coalitions. It turns out that the local bargaining set becomes very large, whereas the glo bal bargaining set is unaltered.