ENDOGENOUS AVAILABILITY, CARTELS, AND MERGER IN AN EQUILIBRIUM PRICE DISPERSION

Authors
Citation
Rp. Mcafee, ENDOGENOUS AVAILABILITY, CARTELS, AND MERGER IN AN EQUILIBRIUM PRICE DISPERSION, Journal of economic theory, 62(1), 1994, pp. 24-47
Citations number
8
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ISSN journal
00220531
Volume
62
Issue
1
Year of publication
1994
Pages
24 - 47
Database
ISI
SICI code
0022-0531(1994)62:1<24:EACAMI>2.0.ZU;2-Q
Abstract
In a generalization of the Butters advertising model, the equilibrium involves one firm that advertises at least twice as much as the others , who all advertise equally. A cartel formation game is considered, an d any equilibrium cartel involves at least two, but generally not all, firms. In one equilibrium, only the largest firms join the cartel. A merger game is considered. and, in equilibrium, the large film buys th e other films in sequence, with discounting equalizing the expected ut ility of the targets and prices rising over time. (C) 1994 Academic Pr ess, Inc.