INFORMATIVE AND PERSUASIVE CAMPAIGNING

In this paper we use a simple Downsian spatial model to analyze the pr operties of campaign contributions. We first consider campaign contrib utions that are intended to inform voters of candidate positions. We s how that it is difficult to construct arguments in a Downsian spatial model for why some voters would choose to contribute to a candidate an d the candidate would want to spend the money contributed to inform vo ters of his position. We then define persuasive campaign expenditures as those that are intended to convince an individual to vote for a can didate regardless of the candidate's position on issues. In the presen ce of persuasive campaign expenditures some voters have an incentive t o contribute to one or both candidates, and the candidates have an inc entive to spend the money. We show why the nature of persuasive campai gn expenditures may explain both their growth in recent years and the increasing advantage of incumbency.