Current Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) Standards for the Profess
ional Practice of Internal Auditing clearly identify the organization
as the chief overall beneficiary of the internal auditor's work. Such
a broad definition allows for significant differences in internal audi
tors' perceived responsibilities to competing ''organization'' benefic
iaries. Ambiguity among internal auditors as to the chief beneficiary
of their work could result in problems for internal auditors, particul
arly when potential beneficiaries have conflicting interests. In this
study, the case of a tender offer was presented to practicing internal
auditors to determine if they would reach a consensus on the principa
l beneficiary when making a tender offer recommendation to management.
An instrument was developed asking internal auditors to make tender o
ffer recommendations to management on an 8-point Likert scale. The ins
trument informed the subject how each of four different interest group
s (shareholders, the going concern, employees, and management) would s
tand to benefit from the tender offer and asked the respondent to make
a recommendation to management based on how these different interest
groups benefitted. The instrument was sent at random to 805 practicing
internal auditors who were IIA members. A total of 113 were returned
which were usable for this study. The participants in this study exhib
ited allegiance to each of the four interest groups, with no one group
dominating the other in importance. Thus, there was no consensus as t
o which group the auditors should place in the priority position. This
finding indicates that existing standards result in considerable ambi
guity in defining the role of internal auditors. These results demonst
rate the need for the IIA to provide additional standards for this and
other areas of internal audit consultation in order to prevent intern
al auditors from being subjected to pressure to adopt a perspective of
the organization which is consistent with the perspective of a specif
ic organizational interest group. These results are limited to the ext
ent that tender offers are a very unique case, the results of which ma
y not be applicable to other cases demanding the expertise of the inte
rnal auditor.