COOPERATION WITHIN THE ENTITY OF THE FIRM - IS THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA FRAMEWORK SUFFICIENT

Authors
NIX J
Citation
J. Nix, COOPERATION WITHIN THE ENTITY OF THE FIRM - IS THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA FRAMEWORK SUFFICIENT, The American journal of economics and sociology, 53(4), 1994, pp. 443-453
Citations number
59
Categorie Soggetti
Economics,Sociology
Journal title
The American journal of economics and sociology → ACNP
ISSN journal
00029246
Volume
53
Issue
4
Year of publication
1994
Pages
443 - 453
Database
ISI
SICI code
0002-9246(1994)53:4<443:CWTEOT>2.0.ZU;2-2
Abstract
When the presence of unexploited free riding opportunities within orga nizations is considered a sign of cooperation among employees, a repea ted prisoner's dilemma game may be used as an explanation. In this pap er, arguments against sole reliance on the repeated prisoner's dilemma game for explaining cooperation within the firm are set forth. Some o verlooked reasons for explaining cooperation are offered.