INTERHEMISPHERIC SHARING OF VISUAL MEMORY IN MACAQUES

(1) In macaques with the optic chiasm transected, and forebrain commis sural communication limited to the anterior commissure or the posterio r 5 mm of the splenium of the corpus callosum, visual patterns viewed initially by only one eye (hemisphere) are subsequently recognized by the other with normal accuracy. (2) The efficiency of these commissura l paths is further indicated by the fact that even when as many as six ''target'' images are presented for memorization to only one hemisphe re, it makes essentially no difference as to accuracy or latency of pe rformance which hemisphere is then required to distinguish ''target'' from ''non-target'' images. (3) By electrically tetanizing structures in one or the other temporal lobe at various times in relation to Visu al input and/or mnemonic testing it could be shown: (a) that a memory trace restricted in its formation to a single hemisphere was available to the other via either forebrain commissure, and (b) that the memory is formed bilaterally despite unilateral input. (4) When the chiasm i s split but the commissures are intact, simultaneous presentation of d isparate images to each hemisphere severely perturbs performance, sugg esting that the callosal system operates continuously to unify visual percepts; but when only the anterior commissure is intact, the two hem ispheres accept incongruent images without perturbation. (5) In the fu lly ''split-brain'' condition, when one hemisphere cannot access memor ies held in the other, the accuracy of performance by each hemisphere is nevertheless burdened by the memory load of its neocortically disco nnected partner. It can thus be inferred that the brainstem plays a cr itical, unifying role in this mnemonic process.