LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES AS LOYALTY-GENERATING INSTITUTIONS

The current debate over models of self-selection in Congress - whether Congressmen by-and-large find themselves on committees which most clo sely correspond to their constituents' interests - has implications fo r theories of Congressional organization. Building on recent findings which question a categorical self-selection process, in this paper we present a theory of committee function based on loyalty to party leade rs. As a rationale for leadership privilege, and to provide context fo r our argument, we first present a theoretical framework based on a mo dified model of cooperation. We then focus on certain specifics of our leadership theory; that rank-and-file members vote leadership interes ts in exchange for leader support in gaining choice committee assignme nts and aid in passing legislation. This leads to predictions about vo ting patterns across committees. Static tests of these relations are p erformed, as well as those incorporating changes in voting patterns wi th seniority.