D. Granot et M. Maschler, THE REACTIVE BARGAINING SET - STRUCTURE, DYNAMICS AND EXTENSION TO NTU GAMES, International journal of game theory, 26(1), 1997, pp. 75-95
Citations number
26
Categorie Soggetti
Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods","Mathematical, Methods, Social Sciences","Mathematics, Miscellaneous","Statistic & Probability
The reactive bargaining set (Granot [1994]) is the set of outcomes for
which no justified objection exists. Here, in a justified objection t
he objector first watches how the target tries to act (if he has such
an option), and then reacts by making a profit and ruining the target'
s attempt to maintain his share.In this paper we explore properties of
the reactive bargaining set, set up the system of inequalities that d
efines it, and construct a dynamic system in the sense of Steams' tran
sfer scheme that leads the players to this set. We also extend the def
inition of the reactive bargaining set to NTU games in a way that keep
s it nonempty. To shed light on its nature and its relative ease of co
mputation, we compute the reactive bargaining set for games that playe
d important role in the game theory literature.