ALTERNATIVE COLLECTIVE-GOODS MODELS OF MILITARY ALLIANCES - THEORY AND EMPIRICS

Citation
Jac. Conybeare et al., ALTERNATIVE COLLECTIVE-GOODS MODELS OF MILITARY ALLIANCES - THEORY AND EMPIRICS, Economic inquiry, 32(4), 1994, pp. 525-542
Citations number
33
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ISSN journal
00952583
Volume
32
Issue
4
Year of publication
1994
Pages
525 - 542
Database
ISI
SICI code
0095-2583(1994)32:4<525:ACMOMA>2.0.ZU;2-R
Abstract
How should the defense activities of allies be aggregated to determine the alliance-wide level of defense? Two alternative models-best shot and weakest link-are contrasted with simple summation of defense spend ing or manpower for aggregating allies' defense efforts. We extend the joint product model to include these methods of aggregation, and devi se an empirical procedure to test between best-shot and weakest -link models. We apply this test to four alliances: Triple Alliance (1880-19 14), Triple Entente (1880-1914), Warsaw Pact (1963-1987), and NATO (19 61-1987). The testing procedure can be applied to other collective cho ice situations.