A NEO2 BAYESIAN FOUNDATION OF THE MAXMIN VALUE FOR 2-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES

A joint derivation of utility and value for two-person zero-sum games is obtained using a decision theoretic approach. Acts map states to co nsequences. The latter are lotteries over prizes, and the set of state s is a product of two finite sets (m rows and n columns). Preferences over acts are complete, transitive, continuous, monotonic and certaint y-independent (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), and satisfy a new axiom which we introduce. These axioms are shown to characterize preferences such that (i) the induced preferences on consequences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and (ii) each act is r anked according to the maxim value of the corresponding m x n utility matrix (viewed as a two-person zero-sum game). An alternative statemen t of the result deals simultaneously with all finite two-person zero-s um games in the framework of conditional acts and preferences.