CONDITIONS FOR DISARMAMENT - A GAME THEORETICAL-MODEL

Authors
ENGELMANN W
Citation
W. Engelmann, CONDITIONS FOR DISARMAMENT - A GAME THEORETICAL-MODEL, Group decision and negotiation, 3(3), 1994, pp. 321-332
Citations number
8
Journal title
Group decision and negotiation → ACNP
ISSN journal
09262644
Volume
3
Issue
3
Year of publication
1994
Pages
321 - 332
Database
ISI
SICI code
0926-2644(1994)3:3<321:CFD-AG>2.0.ZU;2-B
Abstract
Starting from the widely accepted Prisoners' Dilemma model to describe arms race situations between rival powers, we investigate how changes of preference relations among the four strategy combinations (disarma ment and armament for both sides) can help to overcome the arms race d ilemma.