Basic features of a physical-scientific approach for describing intric
ate biological behaviour such as the mind-matter problem are discussed
. The emphasis is put on the fact that we describe Nature by a hierarc
hic structure where concepts are well defined at their proper level bu
t where we must accept that these concepts have a limited scope. This
makes it possible to have ''emergent'' features at higher levels which
do not necessarily have any relevance at lower levels. Reductionism a
nd the distinction between ''predictability'' and ''strict determinism
'' is considered from that aspect. Questions of whether classical mech
anics is inadequate for describing living systems or if quantum mechan
ics is necessary and more appropriate are discussed. It is argued that
''classical mechanics'' seen in the scope of the paper provides the m
ost appropriate framework in this context, and that any conflicting vi
ew is based upon basic misunderstandings. Finally, some aspects of lea
rning, thinking and consciousness are discussed, and it is emphasized
that these must be regarded from a biological-evolutionary point of vi
ew.