INDETERMINACY, JUSTIFICATION AND TRUTH IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

In this Article, Professor Lipkin continues the debate over the nature of indeterminacy in constitutional theory, arguing that epistemic ind eterminacy is most relevant to the law, because epistemic indeterminac y is more closely tied to practical reasoning than is metaphysical ind eterminacy. Professor Lipkin further argues that the controversy over metaphysical or epistemic indeterminacy is really a controversy over t ruth or justification as the primary form of validating constitutional rules. In Professor Lipkin's view, the search for constitutional trut h should be abandoned or, at best, should be treated as a trivial resu lt of the best justification. Finally, Professor Lipkin proposes a new constitutional paradigm, integrating a revised version of Rawls's con ception of wide reflective equilibrium with a modified account of Kuhn 's theory of scientific change that takes into account the distinction between normal and revolutionary adjudication. Such a paradigm, Profe ssor Lipkin argues, provides an interesting and complete account of co nstitutional adjudication and change, and therefore is an especially a ppropriate vehicle to transport constitutional theory into the twenty- first century.