A. Skalaban, POLICY COOPERATION AMONG THE STATES - THE CASE OF INTERSTATE BANKING REFORM, American journal of political science, 37(2), 1993, pp. 415-428
In a competitive environment, why do states sometimes choose policy co
operation over conflict? An analysis of the issue of interstate bankin
g deregulation for the period 1982-88 reveals that states will make of
fers of cooperation based on a history of cooperation, geographic prox
imity, and the desire to advantage themselves relative to the other st
ates. History and geographic proximity remain significant predictors o
f actual policy agreement, but the fact that policy agreement becomes
more likely only when both states have reason to perceive the benefits
as outweighing the possible risks reveals the political nature of gam
e playing among the American states. Thus, this study shows the power
of game theory metaphors for studying policymaking, while reminding us
that each issue has its own specific political and historic context t
hat shapes the strategies of the actors involved.