THE CHALLENGE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

The criminal jury system is characterized by two often conflicting fea tures: (i) A very diverse population, like that in the United States, is likely to result in even rational, open-minded jurors disagreeing a bout issues fundamental to the resolution of any case; and (ii) Almost all jurisdictions require unanimity in order to either acquit or conv ict a defendant on any charge. Using a simple spatial model, we demons trate how the existing allowance for numerous peremptory challenges fa cilitates the production or verdicts by eliminating potential jurors w ith ''extreme'' preferences; however, it does so by sacrificing any se mblance of a democratically representative jury. We show that changing the decision rule governing the jury to simple majority rule also fac ilitates the production of verdicts without discriminating against pot ential jurors because of their anticipated preferences or beliefs. In addition, such a change would eliminate the inefficiencies associated with protracted jury selection and mistrials resulting from hung jurie s.