FODOR, ADAMS AND CAUSAL PROPERTIES - REPLY

Authors
Citation
F. Adams, FODOR, ADAMS AND CAUSAL PROPERTIES - REPLY, Philosophical psychology, 6(1), 1993, pp. 63-65
Citations number
4
Categorie Soggetti
Psychology,Philosophy
Journal title
ISSN journal
09515089
Volume
6
Issue
1
Year of publication
1993
Pages
63 - 65
Database
ISI
SICI code
0951-5089(1993)6:1<63:FAACP->2.0.ZU;2-#
Abstract
In 'Fodor's Modal Argument' I claim that Fodor's latest defence of nar row content does not work. I claim that Fodor's modal argument is an u nsuccessful resurrection of the Logical Connection Argument. Russow cl aims that my arguments fail because I confuse cause properties with ca usal powers, focus on events rather than properties, and overlook the fact that Fodor is trying only to explain narrow behavior. In this pap er, I plead 'not guilty' to all of Fodor's charges. Narrow content sti ll does not exist.