ON COMPLIANCE

A new dialogue is beginning between students of international law and international relations scholars concerning compliance with internatio nal agreements. This article advances some basic propositions to frame that dialogue. First, it proposes that the level of compliance with i nternational agreements ip general is inherently unverifiable by empir ical procedures. That nations generally comply with their internationa l agreements, on the one hand, or that they violate them whenever it i s in their interest to do so, on the other, are not statements of fact or even hypotheses to be tested. Instead, they are competing heuristi c assumptions. Some reasons why the background assumption of a propens ity to comply is plausible and useful are given. Second, compliance pr oblems very often do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate an i nternational undertaking on the basis of a calculation of advantage. T he article proposes a variety of other reasons why states may deviate from treaty obligations and why in many circumstances those reasons ar e properly accepted by others as justifying apparent departures from t reaty norms. Third, the treaty regime as a whole need not and should n ot be held to a standard of strict compliance but to a level of overal l compliance that is ''acceptable'' in the light of the interests and concerns the treaty is designed to safeguard. How the acceptable level is determined and adjusted is considered.