DOES REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT WORK - A PANEL ANALYSIS OF OSHA ENFORCEMENT

Authors
Citation
Wb. Gray et Jt. Scholz, DOES REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT WORK - A PANEL ANALYSIS OF OSHA ENFORCEMENT, Law & society review, 27(1), 1993, pp. 177-213
Citations number
49
Categorie Soggetti
Law
Journal title
ISSN journal
00239216
Volume
27
Issue
1
Year of publication
1993
Pages
177 - 213
Database
ISI
SICI code
0023-9216(1993)27:1<177:DREW-A>2.0.ZU;2-R
Abstract
This study tests the impact of OSHA enforcement on workplace injuries. Using data on injuries and OSHA inspections for a panel of 6,842 larg e manufacturing plants between 1979 and 1985, we find significant spec ific deterrence effects. Inspections imposing penalties induce a 22% d ecline in injuries in the inspected plant during the following few yea rs. We suggest that narrow deterrence perspectives have led to unduly pessimistic assumptions about enforcement effectiveness and that a man agerial attention model is more consistent with our findings. In a tec hnical appendix we describe the Chamberlain technique, a powerful anal ytic approach for panel data that provides tests and corrections for p otential biases endemic in enforcement studies, including unmeasured h eterogeneity among units, serially correlated dependent variables, and endogeneity of inspections. We argue that more empirical studies of e nforcement impacts are necessary to provide an appropriate perspective for descriptive and analytic studies appraising regulatory behavior.