This study tests the impact of OSHA enforcement on workplace injuries.
Using data on injuries and OSHA inspections for a panel of 6,842 larg
e manufacturing plants between 1979 and 1985, we find significant spec
ific deterrence effects. Inspections imposing penalties induce a 22% d
ecline in injuries in the inspected plant during the following few yea
rs. We suggest that narrow deterrence perspectives have led to unduly
pessimistic assumptions about enforcement effectiveness and that a man
agerial attention model is more consistent with our findings. In a tec
hnical appendix we describe the Chamberlain technique, a powerful anal
ytic approach for panel data that provides tests and corrections for p
otential biases endemic in enforcement studies, including unmeasured h
eterogeneity among units, serially correlated dependent variables, and
endogeneity of inspections. We argue that more empirical studies of e
nforcement impacts are necessary to provide an appropriate perspective
for descriptive and analytic studies appraising regulatory behavior.