CHOICE AND EMOTION IN COMPARISON THEORY

This article examines the part played by choice and emotion in compari son processes, processes that lead to such phenomena as happiness, sel f-esteem, relative deprivation, and distributive justice. It begins wi th a systematic look at all the points in a comparison process where c hoice and emotion occur and proceeds to link the concepts and equation s of comparison theory to three important choice and emotion phenomena : framing, emotion management, and emotion display. The article presen ts four illustrations that, among other things, show how the combinati on of comparison theory and rational action theory predicts the framin g effects documented by Tversky and Kahneman and predicts as well inte rruptions in small groups and a variety of gift and bequest behaviors. The analysis highlights several important features of the operation o f choice and emotion in comparison theory. First, except for the mathe matical formula that combines the actual holding and the comparison ho lding of a good or bad to produce the comparison outcome, all aspects of comparison processes are, at least in part, subject to choice. Seco nd, the choices that individuals make, taking account of the productio n rules for the comparison outcomes, shape not only their own but also others' emotions. Third, the choices made in emotion display and in o wn/other emotion management serve a variety of goals, altruistic as we ll as selfish. More broadly, this work suggests that both choice and e motion play important parts in human behavior, scientific accounts tha t exclude one or the other are incomplete. The task ahead is to identi fy and isolate choice elements and emotion elements in the operation o f basic forces and in the determination of observable phenomena.