RELATIVISM IN GIBSON THEORY OF PICTURE PERCEPTION

J.J. Gibson's ecological approach to depiction is compared with Nelson Goodman's relativist theory of representation. Goodman's commitment t o radical relativism and Gibson's to direct realism would make these t hinkers unlikely candidates for comparison if Goodman himself had not indicated a substantial body of agreement with Gibson in the area of p icture perception. The present study analyzes this agreement through s ystematic discussion of the following theses: realism in representatio n is not a function of geometrical optics, physical similarity to what is depicted, or deception; pictures differ in density and articulatio n from words, so that picturing has no explicit vocabulary; and artist s can teach us new ways to see the world. The agreement between Goodma n and Gibson has wide-ranging implications for the further development of what might be called a Gibsonian relativism.