COLLECTIVE ACTION AND GROUP HETEROGENEITY - VOLUNTARY PROVISION VERSUS SELECTIVE INCENTIVES

Several studies have concluded that heterogeneity within a group facil itates the initiation of collective action. However a recent analysis found that heterogeneity can either facilitate or impede collective ac tion, depending on factors like the strength of the temptation to free -ride. Reconciling these conclusions is difficult because the earlier studies assumed that public goods are provided voluntarily, whereas th e later analysis assumed that selective incentives like norms or laws can mandate cooperation. I examine the link between group heterogeneit y and collective action in three regimes: ''voluntary'' ''systems, in which actors make unrestricted decisions to participate in collective action; ''compliance'' systems, in which actors create and enforce nor ms that compel others to participate in public goods production; and ' 'balanced'' systems, in which actors can create and enforce compliance norms or oppose such norms. The analysis reveals a complex link among group heterogeneity, collective action, and the type of regime. By fo stering the organization of previously atomized groups and weakening t he cohesion of high-solidarity groups, heterogeneity in contribution c osts and valuation of the public good can reduce social power differen tials.