DEFEATING DESERT-STORM (AND WHY SADDAM DIDNT)

The single most important key to the Persian Gulf war coalition's succ ess was Saddam Hussein's ''stupifying strategic incompetence and milit ary amateurishness,'' which derived from a general ignorance of his ad versaries' will and capabilities. Saddam believed that the United Stat es would not take what appeared to be tremendous risks in going to war to liberate Kuwait. These illusions were reinforced by the Bush admin istration's pre-war behavior toward Iraq. An Iraqi leadership more con scious of American power, purpose, and policy in the Persian Gulf coul d have thwarted an effective U.S. military response to Iraq's conquest of Kuwait. Among other options, Saddam could have invaded the Saudi o il fields, withdrawn his forces from Kuwait before the UN deadline on January 15, 1991, or made a more determined effort to disrupt the coal ition. Ultimately, however, what mattered to Saddam was his own person al and political survival. He could tolerate expulsion from Kuwait, bu t not an American march on Baghdad. In retrospect, Saddam's timing cou ld not have been strategically worse, coming after the end of the cold war, but before Iraq had obtained nuclear capabilities that could hav e deterred U.S. military intervention.