WHAT IS WRONG WITH APPENDAGE THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The present article distinguishes three kinds of accounts of direct (r eflective) awareness (i.e. awareness of one's mental occurrences causa lly unmediated by any other mental occurrence): mental-eye theory, sel f-intimational theory and appendage theory. These aim to explain the s ame phenomenon, though each proposes that direct (reflective) awarenes s occurs in a fundamentally different way. Also, I address a crucial p roblem that appendage theory must solve: how does a direct (reflective ) awareness succeed in being awareness specifically of the particular mental-occurrence instance that is its object? Appendage theory is sin gled out for this attention because psychologists, as they embark on t heir renewed study of consciousness, are most likely to be attracted b y appendage theory for their explanation of direct (reflective) awaren ess.