THE NEW RUSSIAN DIASPORA - MINORITY PROTECTION IN THE SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES

Authors
Citation
P. Kolsto, THE NEW RUSSIAN DIASPORA - MINORITY PROTECTION IN THE SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES, Journal of peace research, 30(2), 1993, pp. 197-217
Citations number
41
Categorie Soggetti
International Relations
Journal title
ISSN journal
00223433
Volume
30
Issue
2
Year of publication
1993
Pages
197 - 217
Database
ISI
SICI code
0022-3433(1993)30:2<197:TNRD-M>2.0.ZU;2-7
Abstract
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has transformed the 25 million eth nic Russians living outside the Russian Federation into a new Russian diaspora. This situation represents a potential threat to political st ability among and within the Soviet successor states. Right-wing polit ical groups in Russia pose as defenders of the national rights of the diaspora. If they were able to induce the Russian Army to intervene in the non-Russian states on behalf of the diaspora, a situation dangero usly similar to the Yugoslav conflict could arise. The problem of the diaspora can be neutralized through migration, border regulations and/ or the establishment of regimes for minority rights. The stabilizing/d estabilizing potential of each of these options is evaluated here with reference to the recent post-Soviet debate on the issue. It is argued that large-scale migration aimed at creating optimally 'pure' ethnic nation-states may easily unleash uncontrollable chain reactions. Most non-Russian successor states are categorically opposed to border regul ations; many Russian politicians have qualms as well. They are, inter alia, afraid that if the principle of the popular will is used to dete rmine territorial issues, it might lead to a dismantling of the multi- ethnic Russian Federation. The least destabilizing option seems to be minority protection. The West could contribute to a viable human right s regime in the CIS by applying a differentiated trade and aid policy and giving the respective governments material incentives to respect t he rights of the minorities. In any case, the leadership in the non-Ru ssian successor states should, in their own interest, avoid providing the irredentist parties in Russian politics with arguments and sympath izers.