Risk in any complex technology is unavoidable. One of the best ways to
reduce risk in the future is to learn from the mistakes of the past.
Between June 1985 and January 1987, the Therac-25, a computerized radi
ation therapy machine, was involved in six massive radiation overdoses
. As a result. several people died and others were seriously injured.
These accidents have been described as the worst series of radiation a
ccidents in the 35-year history of medical accelerators. Published des
criptions of the Therac-25 medical electron accelerator accidents leav
e out important details and are thus often misleading. The authors pre
sent a detailed investigation of the factors involved in the overdoses
and attempts by users, manufacturers, and government agencies to deal
with the accidents. Most accidents are system accidents stemming from
complex interactions between various components and activities. To at
tribute a single cause to an accident is usually a mistake. The author
s demonstrate (1) the complex nature of accidents and (2) the need to
investigate all aspects of system development and operation in order t
o prevent future accidents. The authors also present some lessons lear
ned in terms of system engineering, software engineering, and governme
nt regulation of safety-critical systems containing software component
s.