DEMOCRATIC DIVERSIONS - GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND THE EXTERNALIZATION OF DOMESTIC CONFLICT

Students of international politics have often argued that state leader s initiate the use of force internationally to divert attention away f rom domestic problems. The author contends that these arguments concer ning the relationship between domestic unrest and international confli ct are not supported empirically because they focus too narrowly on th e incentives state leaders have to use external force as a diversionar y tactic without considering alternative solutions to quieting domesti c unrest. It is hypothesized that democratic leaders will respond to d omestic unrest by diverting attention by using force internationally. On the other hand, authoritarian leaders are expected to repress the u nrest directly, and these acts of repression will make them less likel y to use force internationally. An analysis of the initiation of force by the challenging states in 180 international crises between 1948 an d 1982 strongly supports these hypotheses. The results of the analyses and their implications for the literature on diversionary conflicts a nd the rapidly growing literature on democratic peace are discussed.