The beaver (Castor canadensis) population in the United States has cau
sed severe damage to valuable timberland through dam-building and floo
ding of bottomland forest. Traditionally, beavers have provided a sour
ce of livelihood to a small group of people. However, recent low pelt
prices have failed to stimulate adequate trapping pressure, and thus h
ave resulted in increased beaver populations and damage losses. The lo
w trapping pressure has left the burden of nuisance control on propert
y owners. Since beaver populations are mobile, beaver extermination in
controlled parcels results in beaver immigration from neighboring les
s controlled parcels. Beaver migration from less controlled to control
led parcels imposes an external cost (negative diffusion externality)
on the owners of controlled parcels because they must incur the future
cost of trapping immigrating beavers. Unless all land owners agree to
control the beaver population simultaneously, the diffusion externali
ty can decrease the incentive of individual landowners to control nuis
ance beavers, thereby driving a wedge between social and private needs
for such control. This study attempts to develop a bioeconomic model
that incorporates dispersive population dynamics of beavers into the d
esign of a cost-minimizing trapping strategy. Attention is focused on
the situation where all landowners in a given habitat share a common i
nterest in controlling beaver damages, and thus collectively agree to
place the area-wide control decision in the hands of a public agency o
n a cost-sharing basis. The public manager is assumed to minimize the
present value of combined timber damage and trapping costs over a fini
te period of time, subject to spatiotemporal dynamics of beaver popula
tion. These dynamics are summarized by a parabolic diffusive Volterra-
Lotka partial differential equation, and the population control proble
m is cast in the framework of a distributed-parameter-control model. T
he cost-minimizing area-wide trapping model accounts for net migration
at each location and time, and characterizes the beaver-control strat
egy that leaves sufficient beavers to strike an optimal balance betwee
n timber damage and trapping costs. The marginality condition governin
g this trade-off requires that avoided timber damage (measured as the
imputed nuisance value, or ''shadow price,'' of the beaver stock in th
e area) be balanced by trapping cost. The optimality system for this p
roblem is solved numerically. The validity of the theoretical model is
empirically examined using the bioeconomic data collected for the Wil
dlife Management Regions of the New York State Department of Environme
ntal Conservation. Empirical simulation generates discrete values for
optimal beaver densities and trapping rates across all individual oper
ational units over time. The optimal trapping program causes the initi
ally uneven population distribution to eventually smooth out across th
e habitat. The sensitivity analysis alternates trapping-cost and timbe
r-damage parameters between high and low values. Increased trapping co
sts decrease the level of trapping in the initial years of the optimal
program, thereby leaving more beavers in the habitat. This triggers m
ore intensive trapping during the later years of the program, requires
more beavers to be trapped over the entire time horizon, and results
in a higher overall program cost. Alternatively, increased timber-dama
ge potential calls for increased trapping in the initial years of the
program. Fewer beavers are maintained in the habitat and less trapping
is required in the later years. Perhaps surprisingly, this results in
a smaller number of beavers trapped over the entire time horizon.