INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE - LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES

This paper explores the extent and character of interest group influen ce on legislative policy in a model of decision making under incomplet e information. A committee may propose an alternative to a given statu s quo under closed rule. Policies are related to consequences with ex ante uncertainty. An interest group is able to acquire policy-relevant information at a price and has access to legislators at both the agen da-setting stage and the vote stage. Lobbying is modeled as a game of strategic information transmission. The price of information is itself a private datum to the group, and legislators cannot observe whether the group elects to become informed. If the group is informed, then it s information is likewise private. Among the results are that not all informed lobbyists choose to try to influence the agenda directly; tha t there can coexist influential lobbying at both stages of the process ; and that while informative agenda stage lobbying is generically infl uential, the same is not true of voting stage lobbying.