WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR COALITION GAMES - A VALUATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES

Methods are proposed for the valuation of strategic offensive and defe nsive force structures, with emphasis on the consideration of incentiv es for the formation of coalitions. Coalitions consist of subsets of t he nuclear weapons states, together with the nonnuclear weapons states taken as components of the total value target inventory. The basic ap proach is to formulate and solve two worldwide nuclear coalition games . In the first game, the first striking coalition is retaliated agains t by the surviving weapons of the second striking coalition, minimizin g the objective function of the first striking coalition. In the secon d game, the surviving weapons of the second striking coalition are use d to maximize its own objective function. The objective function in bo th models is the percent of surviving value. The games differ substant ially. Computational results are presented for all possible coalitions of nuclear weapons states and neutrals. Offensive weapons, defensive weapons, and value target data bases are varied. Results are very sens itive to coalition composition, the number of value targets, and the n umber of offensive and defensive weapons.