This paper considers the problem of the competition among a finite num
ber of players who must transport the fixed volume of traffic on a sim
ple network over a prescribed planning horizon. Each player attempts t
o minimize his total transportation cost by making simultaneous decisi
ons of departure time, route, and flow rate over time. The problem is
modeled as a N-person nonzero-sum differential game. Two solution conc
epts are applied: [1] the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution and [2]
the feedback Nash equilibrium solution. Optimality conditions are deri
ved and given an economic interpretation as a dynamic game theoretic g
eneralization of Wardrop's second principle. Future extensions of the
model are also discussed. The model promises potential applications to
Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems (IVHS) and air traffic control sy
stems. (C) 1993 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.