Ml. Busch et Er. Reinhardt, NICE STRATEGIES IN A WORLD OF RELATIVE GAINS - THE PROBLEM OF COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY, The Journal of conflict resolution, 37(3), 1993, pp. 427-445
The debate between neoliberals and realists in the field of internatio
nal relations draws heavily on the findings offered in Robert Axelrod'
s Evolution of Cooperation. Axelrod's well-known argument is that coop
eration can emerge among egoists despite the absence of a central auth
ority. This article assesses the robustness of Axelrod's findings in l
ight of the realist critique that relative gains concerns make coopera
tion less likely than neoliberals contend. We build on an amended pris
oner's dilemma (PD) game and conduct a computer simulation tournament
in which we vary (1) the payoff structure and (2) Axelrod's population
of strategies. The results indicate that cooperation can emerge even
under strong relative gains concerns, so long as the population of str
ategies is sufficiently retaliatory. On the basis of this finding, we
argue that the realist critique is overstated: the introduction of gre
ater relative gains concerns does not necessarily limit the prospects
for cooperation among states.