SELF, GROUP, AND PUBLIC INTERESTS MOTIVATING RACIAL POLITICS

Racial politics may be expected to involve a commons dilemma in which voters perceive the choice of political candidates of different races as a zero-sum game. To test this expectation, regression models were c onstricted based on survey data collected during the 1988 New York Cit y-mayoral primary between David Dinkins and Edward Koch. Both the perc eption of racial outgroup threat and dissatisfaction with public resou rces predicted candidate support in registered Democrats. Thus, commun al interests supplemented racial group power interests as motives for candidate support, despite apparent power conflict and resource compet ition between racial and class groups. Group power concerns appeared t o reflect symbolic concerns with procedural justice rather than concer n with personal or collective resource distributions. Symbolic racial politics may reflect social competition aimed at enhancing self-esteem through group identification. Political appeals to public resource co ncerns are concluded to be more effective and less destructive campaig n strategies than appeals to either social competition for symbolic em powerment or realistic group competition for resource distributions.