The purchaser-provider split is an integral part of the New Zealand an
d UK health care reforms. The split is seen as an opportunity to intro
duce competition by increasing the number of players. The assumption i
s that competition among providers, purchasers or indeed funders, incr
eases efficiency and provides more consumer choice. This paper looks a
t the issue of contracting in the New Zealand health services within t
he framework of transaction cost analysis. It examines evidence about
the effects of formal contracting rather than the more traditional, in
formal negotiations that take place within a hierarchy. A number of po
tential problems with an indiscriminate provider split are highlighted
and the conclusion drawn, that the outcome of such a split is likely
to be more unpredictable than official expectations. In the absence of
pilots, monitoring the implementation will be critically important to
be able to compare the outcomes of different ways of organising the h
ealth care system.