FORMS OF LIFE - UNPROGRAMMABILITY CONSTITUTES THE OUTSIDE OF A SYSTEMAND ITS AUTONOMY

The question ''What is life,'' has long been discussed, and many conce pts representing what are regarded as essential properties of life hav e been proposed, namely information generating processes, complex syst ems, indefinite boundaries, and self-reference. Self-referential forms in particular play a central role in autonomous life, because both in ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes we find self-referential forms and self-reference introduces other important features of life. Howev er, because self-reference is strongly connected with self-contradicti on and/or unprogrammability, it cannot be described in the paradigm of prediction or dynamics. It is inevitable to estimate the problem of i nstability of the description itself. We here discuss self-reference a nd unprogrammability with respect to the mixture between inter- and in tracellular computations in biological systems, and we replace the dif ference between computation velocities at different levels by the diff erence between the velocity of observation propagation and that of a p article. We also define the formal system of communication and transpl ant the problem of unprogrammability resulting from the finite velocit y of observation propagation in that system. Here it is illustrated th at unprogrammability is isomorphic to the incompleteness of a formal s ystem. Further, we formally estimate the relationship of unprogrammabi lity and one-to-many type mapping and propose the formalization using a universal arrow, based on Wittgenstein's idea, language games, and p erformativeness. Because unprogrammability does not exist as a real en tity, but is constituted, we can formalize one-to-many type mapping an d even unstable formal description. The concept of autonomy is not bey ond formal description; however it is beyond the paradigm of predictio n.