CONTINGENT FEES FOR ATTORNEYS - AN ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS

Citation
Dl. Rubinfeld et S. Scotchmer, CONTINGENT FEES FOR ATTORNEYS - AN ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS, The Rand journal of economics, 24(3), 1993, pp. 343-356
Citations number
19
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
ISSN journal
07416261
Volume
24
Issue
3
Year of publication
1993
Pages
343 - 356
Database
ISI
SICI code
0741-6261(1993)24:3<343:CFFA-A>2.0.ZU;2-C
Abstract
When there is asymmetric information, contingent fees can allow client s to signal the qualities of their cases and attorneys to signal the q uality of their advice. Thus, a well-informed client who has a high-qu ality case will be willing to pay a relatively high fixed fee and a re latively low contingency percentage, while a client with a low-quality case will prefer a low fixed fee and a high contingency percentage. I n contrast, a well-informed high-quality attorney will signal her abil ity by working for a relatively high contingency percentage.