K. Vannuys, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THROUGH THE PROXY PROCESS - EVIDENCE FROM THE 1989 HONEYWELL PROXY SOLICITATION, Journal of financial economics, 34(1), 1993, pp. 101-132
This paper analyzes a proxy solicitation and subsequent restructuring
at Honeywell Inc. in 1989. The solicitation was financed and led by no
ninstitutional investors and co-sponsored by two public pension funds.
The solicitation and restructuring both appear to increase firm value
, though the effects of the restructuring are much larger. The voting
records of Honeywell's 72 largest institutional shareholders reveal th
at banks and insurance companies are significantly more supportive of
two management-sponsored antitakeover proposals than public pension fu
nds and independent investment managers. Existing business ties betwee
n Honeywell and its institutional investors, however, do not appear to
explain these voting differences.