A wide variety of scholars agree that the Supreme Court's responsibili
ties include a teaching function. Despite the popularity of this idea,
it raises perplexing theoretical questions. What does the Court teach
? Why does America's ''marketplace of ideas'' require a government tea
cher? Are educative responsibilities consistent with the Court's respo
nsibility to apply the law? In this Article, Professor Eisgruber devel
ops an integrated answer to these questions. Professor Eisgruber argue
s that the Court teaches not by propounding scholarly doctrines, but b
y offering ad hominem lessons capable of inspiring Americans to honor
their values. He suggests that such ad hominem lessons might become ra
re because they are not directly relevant to the selection of competin
g policies. Professor Eisgruber then examines the institutional incent
ives that operate on the Court, and argues that these incentives both
enable and induce Justices to convey occasional effective lessons abou
t constitutional principle. These incentives, however, vary with the t
heory of constitutional interpretation adopted by the Justices. Illumi
nating his argument through examples drawn from cases like West Virgin
ia v. Barnette, Brown v. Board of Education, and Cohen v. California,
Professor Eisgruber concludes that the Supreme Court's educative respo
nsibilities inevitably compromise the Court's performance of its other
duties.