The replacement of the Shah's regime by an Islamic fundamentalist gove
rnment in Iran resulted in the outlawing of interest-bearing credit an
d its replacement with a credit system which accords with the teaching
s of the Koran. Two forms of credit are acceptable: interest-free loan
s, and profit-and-loss-sharing loans. Although the latter have assumed
only a small proportion of lending by the Agricultural Bank, they are
potentially attractive to small risk-averse farmers because of their
risk-sharing characteristics. In particular, they pass part of the bus
iness risk (e.g. due to uncertainty in yields and prices) back to the
lender and avoid creating any financial risk for the borrower. A model
is developed to explore the impact of Islamic credit on borrower beha
viour and a numerical illustration is also provided. Results of a farm
survey are reported, and indicate that small risk-averse farmers pref
er the Islamic credit system, whilst medium and large-scale farmers pr
efer interest-based credit. Some of the obstacles to more widespread u
ptake of the Islamic credit system in Iranian agriculture are identifi
ed.