The concept of ''appraisal'' has been used in the literature in a dual
way: to refer to the content of emotional experience, as well as to t
he cognitive antecedents of emotions. I argue that appraisal in the fo
rmer sense is what is contained in information in self-reports and tha
t this information is of limited use for making inferences on emotion
antecedents. This is so because emotional experience may contain appra
isals that are part of the emotional response rather than belonging to
its causes. They often result from elaboration of the experience afte
r it has begun to be generated. Although in most or all emotions some
cognitive appraisal processes are essential antecedents, these process
es may be much simpler than self-reports (and the semantics of emotion
words) may suggest. The appraisal processes that account for emotion
elicitation can be assumed to be of a quite elementary kind.