Drought by itself does not lead to famine. That requires severe econom
ic weakness, very poor national and/or external response and/or war. I
n practice, mass starvation does not happen in Africa in the absence o
f war. However, the degree of hunger and, perhaps even more, the speed
of affected household livelihood recovery depend heavily on domestic
and international strategic responses. The present standard donor poli
tical economy of response to crisis is one-off, short term, not incorp
orating livelihood rehabilitation or future vulnerability reduction. F
urther, it is usually managed in a way fragmenting national response a
nd frequently decapacitating national structures. This 'Good Samaritan
' approach provides no link back to 'normal development' which also te
nds to exclude post drought reconstruction by livelihood rehabilitatio
n. National responses vary in coherence, degree of sophistication, cap
acity and relationship to sustaining or rehabilitating livelihoods. In
part this reflects governing coalition political priorities - in the
absence of war even a very poor state can mount programmes averting ma
ss migration and famine (e.g. Tanzania). Both normative and efficiency
criteria suggest more coherent/nationally owned responses within ongo
ing donor and national emergency response structures; greater expediti
on in action to avert people being forced to leave their homes, and bu
ilding livelihood rehabilitation and future vulnerability reduction co
mponents into drought responses as integral components.