THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF DROUGHT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 1991-1993

Drought by itself does not lead to famine. That requires severe econom ic weakness, very poor national and/or external response and/or war. I n practice, mass starvation does not happen in Africa in the absence o f war. However, the degree of hunger and, perhaps even more, the speed of affected household livelihood recovery depend heavily on domestic and international strategic responses. The present standard donor poli tical economy of response to crisis is one-off, short term, not incorp orating livelihood rehabilitation or future vulnerability reduction. F urther, it is usually managed in a way fragmenting national response a nd frequently decapacitating national structures. This 'Good Samaritan ' approach provides no link back to 'normal development' which also te nds to exclude post drought reconstruction by livelihood rehabilitatio n. National responses vary in coherence, degree of sophistication, cap acity and relationship to sustaining or rehabilitating livelihoods. In part this reflects governing coalition political priorities - in the absence of war even a very poor state can mount programmes averting ma ss migration and famine (e.g. Tanzania). Both normative and efficiency criteria suggest more coherent/nationally owned responses within ongo ing donor and national emergency response structures; greater expediti on in action to avert people being forced to leave their homes, and bu ilding livelihood rehabilitation and future vulnerability reduction co mponents into drought responses as integral components.