THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRATIC COMPETITION - THE CASE OF NATURAL-RESOURCE POLICY

Many concerned with how government functions consider creating competi tion between bureaucracies an attractive option. Others are skeptical of what impact rival agencies have when they are operating within a po litical context. Reflecting these discrepant viewpoints, some scholars believe that regulators will compete vigorously for resources and res ponsibilities; others assert that agency members will act passively as they attempt to protect their autonomy. To assess these contrasting p erspectives and determine why competitive agency structures might exis t, the following analysis examines one of the classic situations where agencies can serve as functional substitutes: the relationship betwee n the United States Forest Service and the National Park Service. The results demonstrate that agencies put far more weight on autonomy than competition. The principal advantage of functional rivalry for politi cians-at least where federal lands are concerned-is to expand the choi ce set of alternatives available to them.