Many clinicians wrongly interpret p-values as probabilities. that trea
tment has an adverse effect and confidence intervals as probability in
tervals. Such inferences can be validly drawn from Bayesian analyses o
f trial results. These analyses use the data to update the prior (or p
re-trial) beliefs to give posterior (or post-trial) beliefs about the
magnitude of a treatment effect. However, for these methods to pin acc
eptance in the medical literature, understanding between statisticians
and clinicians of the issues involved in choosing appropriate prior d
istributions for trial reporting needs to be reached. I focus on two t
ypes of prior that deserve consideration. The first is the non-informa
tive prior giving standardized likelihood distributions as post-trial
probability distributions. Their use is unlikely to be controversial a
mong statisticians whilst being intuitively appealing to clinicians. T
he second type of prior has a spike of probability mass at the point o
f no treatment effect. Varying the magnitude of the spike illustrates
the sensitivity of the conclusions drawn to the degree of prior scepti
cism in a treatment effect. With both, graphical displays provide clin
ical readers with the opportunity to explore the results more fully. A
n example of how a clinical trial might be reported in the medical lit
erature using these methods is given.