DIVIDED GOVERNMENT AND THE SUPREME-COURT - JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR IN CIVIL-RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES CASES, 1954-89

One of the common explanations for the existence of divided government is that voters, preferring moderate public policy outcomes, split the ir tickets in voting for president and Congress. This argument presume s that divided government in fact results in more moderate policy outc omes than would be the case under unified government. To date, no one has examined the consequences of divided government for policymaking b y the Supreme Court. Does appointment of Supreme Court justices under conditions of divided government produce a more moderate Court? The au thors address this question in the context of civil rights and liberti es cases, looking at liberal-conservative voting by justices between 1 954 and 1989, inclusive. They test a model of Supreme Court decision m aking that incorporates a number of factors along with the existence o f divided party government at the time of a justice's appointment. The se factors include the number of years the individual justice has serv ed on the Court, and the possible effects of the increased politicizat ion of the Court and the judicial selection process since 1968. The au thors find that appointment under divided party government is a signif icant predictor of moderation in civil rights and liberties decision m aking by the Court.