WHEN IS IT RATIONAL TO BE MAGNANIMOUS IN VICTORY

There are two contending schools of thought on how a victor should tre at a defeated party after a war or other major dispute. Whereas magnan imity might quell the desire of the defeated party for revenge, it mig ht also be instrumental in the defeated party's resurrection. Similarl y, the defeated party might face the conflicting choices of whether to cooperate or not cooperate with the victor. These interdependent choi ces am modeled by a generic 2 x 2 ''magnanimity game'' (MG), which sub sumes 12 different specific games that might arise in the aftermath of a war Rational choices in MG are based on two-sided analysis, in whic h players can think ahead several moves and take account of each other 's preferences Cycling may or may not be permitted, if it is, which pl ayer possesses ''moving power'' can be critical to the outcome. The an alysis is illustrated by historical examples from 19th- and 20th-centu ry wars.