After reviewing problems that the Supreme Court opinions on the defini
tion of ''security'' have addressed and have caused, this Article sugg
ests revising the Court's current tests. The Court's first stage of de
finition cases dealt with atypical investment schemes covered under th
e rubric ''investment contract.'' In its first two Cases, the Court fi
rst ignored, then altered the SEC's proposed test, making it under-inc
lusive and thereby inviting promoters to try to escape securities law
coverage either by giving the investor a nominal role in the enterpris
e or by targeting investors one at a time. For investment contracts, t
his Article suggests a return to the SEC's original test, which reache
d investment schemes if they involved either multiple investors (hence
'horizontal community'') relying predominantly on the efforts of the
promoter or one or more investors relying solely on such efforts. In i
ts second phase, the Court addressed arrangements whose names were the
same as well-recognized securities such as stocks and bonds (''enumer
ated categories'') but whose economic realities were not those of a se
curity. The Court created certain judicial approaches for excluding su
ch arrangements from coverage, usually by emphasizing legislative purp
ose over statutory language. Although well-intended, the Court's attem
pt to forestall over-inclusive coverage threatened under-inclusiveness
and unwarranted judicial activism. The Court redressed this threat in
its third phase, in which it created rebuttable presumptions for cove
rage-initially for stock, then for notes-thereby following the statuto
ry language more literally and more readily finding enumerated categor
ies to be securities. This Article argues that this approach has been
appropriate for stock but inappropriate for notes. The presumption tha
t a stock is a security is correct because owning rights to the residu
al returns of a business enterprise and thus participating proportiona
lly in its risks and returns is the paradigm of an investment. Moreove
r, the presumption for coverage should be extended, with certain excep
tions, to all equity arrangments. The presumption that notes are secur
ities, however, is over-inclusive and threatens various economic dislo
cation. Only investment notes should be treated as securities; consume
r and commercial notes should not. Accordingly, this Article proposes
that the two opposing poles of the spectrum between investment and com
mercial notes be identified and then governed by two opposing presumpt
ions, one for and one against coverage. Thus, for example, notes sold
to the public through investment banks constitute the paradigm of the
investment note and should be presumed a security. Notes given to comm
ercial banks by borrowers in ordinary commercial banking activities an
d notes given in consumer transactions, however, should be presumed no
t to be securities. Between the two extremes, no presumption should go
vern, and securities law coverage should depend on notes being closer
to an investment context than to a commercial or consumer context.