Lj. Alston et Jp. Ferrie, PATERNALISM IN AGRICULTURAL LABOR CONTRACTS IN THE UNITED-STATES SOUT- IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GROWTH OF THE WELFARE-STATE, The American economic review, 83(4), 1993, pp. 852-876
We examine paternalism as an implicit contract in which workers trade
faithful service for nonmarket goods. Paternalism reduced monitoring a
nd turnover costs in cotton cultivation in the U.S. South until the me
chanization of the cotton harvest in the 1950's. Until then, the effec
tiveness of paternalism was threatened by government programs that cou
ld have substituted for paternalism; but large Southern landowners had
the political power to prevent the appearance of such programs in the
South. With mechanization, the economic incentive to provide paternal
ism disappeared, and Southern congressmen allowed welfare programs to
expand in ways consistent with their interests. 033, P16)