Faced with growing criticism of a foreign policy that is regarded as t
oo soft, too pro-western, and insufficiently attentive to Russian nati
onal interests-and the opposition comes not only from the so-called ''
reds and browns '' and the military, but from centrist and democratic
circles as well-President Yeltsin has been obliged to cede foreign pol
icy positions in an effort to save domestic ones. It is a measure of t
he Russian president's uncertain hold on power that much of the opposi
tion program outlined by his foreign minister, in a mock speech last D
ecember, has since become the official language of Russian diplomacy.
The concept of national interest has become a codeword for internal op
position to Russia's foreign and domestic policy, and the debate has r
anged over such issues as Russia's Eurasian roots, the extent of Mosco
w's authority over the territory of the former USSR, and an appropriat
e national security strategy for Russia. Post-communist Russia has sti
ll to determine its national identity, national character, and nationa
l interests in world affairs. It is an inauspicious time for such a de
bate: constitutional crisis has reinforced separatist tendencies, econ
omic decline has promoted regional autarkies, and disparate political
philosophies project competing images of state and nation. Nevertheles
s, at the same time, there is a nation-building quality to the process
, as it seeks to identify common values and expectations. An enlighten
ed view of its strategic interests could form a basis for Russian fore
ign policy that is both understandable and predictable. The danger lie
s in the prospect that the search for the national interest will conti
nue to elude a national consensus.