Classical diversionary theory suggests that domestic strife leads to foreig
n aggression. This theory has been unsupported empirically because it ignor
es the critical role played by the military in decisions to use force abroa
d. Strife leads to external aggression when it threatens the organizational
interests of the military; otherwise, the military is reluctant to do poli
ticians' dirty work. Only a particular type of domestic strife-contested po
litical institutions or conflict over the fundamental rules of the politica
l game-necessarily threatens the military's interests and thereby encourage
s aggression. Using annual observations on all countries since 1827, we est
imate fixed-effects duration dependent legit: models of the initiation of v
iolence at home and abroad. We find robust evidence showing that contested
institutions significantly increase the probability of the initiation of vi
olence and that they account for violence usually attributed to other forms
of domestic strife, regime type, and regime change.